In spite of the increasing importance of climate and environmental factors when triggering human displacements, it is necessary to emphasize their interaction with other social, economic and political factors so we can better understand migratory movements today.

The existence of more cohesive and supportive social, economic and political systems will be better placed to face climate impacts and enhance the adaptive capacity and resilience of communities to help avoid displacements. On the other hand, an increase in human migrations in search of better habitats to ensure a minimum level of subsistence might lead to communities suffering from increased resource scarcity and greater social inequalities and vulnerability to climate impacts.

Considering these challenges for international human rights law, we may find that the negative impact of climate change on people’s livelihoods, economies and political structures, might lead to States becoming unable to fulfil their responsibilities to protect the lives and rights of its citizens.

However, the issue of “environmental refugees” has not resulted in the mobilization of the international community in defence of their rights. The recognition of a new typology of refugees could impose excessive obligations for developed countries, either in terms of support and protection or economic terms. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) does not legally recognize the term “environmental refugee” because it can create confusion and undermine the international legal regime for the protection of refugees according to the Geneva Convention of 1951.

It is interesting to recall the People’s Agreement of the World People’s Conference on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth held in Cochabamba, Bolivia in 2010:

 “Developed countries, as the main cause of climate change, in assuming their historical responsibility, must recognize and honour their climate debt in all of its dimensions as the basis for a just, effective, and scientific solution to climate change. In this context, we demand that developed countries:

… Assume responsibility for the hundreds of millions of people that will be forced to migrate due to the climate change caused by these countries, and eliminate their restrictive immigration policies, offering migrants a decent life with full human rights guarantees in their countries.”

While new protection frameworks are expected to be designed either inside or outside the Geneva Convention, or under the recognition of a climate debt, an approach to the problem from a human rights perspective is necessary from national and international authorities.

There is a need to establish minimum standards of treatment based on human rights when dealing with human displacement due to climate change, to which all individuals are entitled, whether in their country of origin or in host communities; and which excludes any inhuman or degrading treatment.

Similarly, when facing climate impacts, human rights protection frameworks might enable individuals to claim protection in a third country, based on the extended principle of “non-refoulement” under the framework of “complementary protection”.

But there are other rights linked to human rights, like the right to an adequate standard of living and the continuous improvement of living conditions, or the right not to be deprived of a means of a livelihood which are at stake under a changing climate. This could result in forcing populations to move and negatively affect their ability to hunt, fish, gather, or farm.

Some of the answers come from an understanding of migration as an adaptive practice. But there is also the need to understand the importance of enhancing community responsiveness. The Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants said that “migration may in fact be an important adaptation strategy ” but he also considered the right to not migrate, recalling the obligations of the international community to do everything possible to prevent forced migration.

From these two different but complementary visions, we conclude with some practical answers from a rights-based approach:

Understanding and advocating that those displaced by climate change are workers, often low-skilled and in need of protection;

And because differential treatment between migrant and local workers undermines the basis of societies built around non-discrimination and human rights, and protecting their right to work as a means of generating remittances to their home communities in order to cope with climate impacts. The Multilateral Framework on Labour Migration of the International Labour Organization (ILO) can be of great importance in this regard.

From the defence and promotion of basic levels of social protection for those who remain, to help build a more cohesive and cooperative societies to climate impacts, resulting in access to essential social transfers and services that can ensure universal access to essential medical services and basic incomes. Initiatives such as the Social Protection Floors, already developed in several countries that are facing both environmental degradation and deep inequality, may be an example to follow.

The world needs a new “why” for climate action.  Unless the public embraces a vision for climate action that is consistent with their notions of prosperity, politicians will not challenge the status quo inside their governments and political parties.  Latin American countries need a new “why” for climate action; and nowhere is this potential for reframing political storytelling on climate action greater than in middle-income developing countries.  The public is worried about climate change. But is it asking politicians to commit to bold climate action at home? Not yet.

In April, I had the opportunity to engage in this debate at a workshop on climate justice organized by the Government of Chile in collaboration with specialist organizations. Here I share the framing thoughts that I proposed in Santiago as part of an ongoing question on whether to tackle the climate challenge head on—or look the other way.

From the unthinkable to the new normal

Today, the idea that politicians commit to climate responsibility is unthinkable.  Everyone who cares about the moral imperative of a below 2-degree world is worried, skeptical or even cynical. Few believe that the economic and financial establishments in our countries will ever agree that protecting the climate will help our prosperity, not hurt it. But I am convinced our public will embrace the unthinkable and demand climate action from our politicians, companies and ourselves. I still believe that people do stand for the country they want.

And if you are skeptical about the power of people, take a quick scan at a few examples that I have witnessed in my lifetime. Unthinkable ideas during my teenage years are the norm in 2013.

• A black president in the U.S.
• Rejection of Apartheid and Mandela as President of South Africa
• A unified Germany and a wall transformed into a tourist attraction
• A Mexican running the OECD, a Woman the IMF
• A Western government giving up nuclear energy
• Qatar hosting the annual U.N. Climate Summit
• The Arab Spring
• China as the world´s 2^nd economy, the rise of “BRICS”
• YouTube, Facebook, Twitter, Blogs, SMS, Google, and Wikileaks
• A Latin American Pope in the Vatican

The list goes on including a woman as the President of my country, Costa Rica—an inconceivable idea when I was born. Many battles are still pending and yet I stand by my optimism: when a political narrative´s time comes, it spreads and conquers the hearts and minds of millions.

We lack a winning climate narrative

The struggle against the high-carbon economy cannot be won unless the battle for a low-carbon shift becomes a political battle that is fought publicly and at the ballot box. We have had years of climate debates—and ironically much of the heat consumes the climate community with internal disagreements on strategy or ideology. We lack a better, bigger story on climate and society that works for mainstream politicos epitomized by the contest of ideas in the public realm during elections. The big reflection that often comes from holding the mirror up in front of a nation and asking who benefits most from low-carbon growth.

So here are the questions looming large: Does “carbon” work as the rudder for a national climate narrative? Will “carbon” or “emissions” mobilize the public in our regions?  Not really. In Chile I even argued that mitigation-centric narratives will not work at all. The activist framing for action on the basis of “CO₂ reductions are the right thing to do” simply does not work during an election.  This is partly because it does not inspire anyone. This is not because the public does not care about climate change.  The public does care. Mothers care. Doctors care. Teachers care. Vulnerable communities care and are asking everyone to care.  But the framing of the political argument in the public debate must change if we do engage those who care. The framing must shift towards people.

Clearly, the technical debate still needs the new IPCC report, the tracking of the emissions gap and the frantic ppm concentration reminders (we do need the 350.org and Avaaz-like campaigns). My point is different. I am talking about the climate and our politicos: the grand narrative that we need in Latin America needs to be free from a legacy of “carbon-centric” or “mitigation-centric” framings that are being developed elsewhere.

In addition to “mitigation” (especially carbon pricing) not stirring our imaginations in the quest for a new development pathway, mitigation-centric narratives quickly trigger defensive reactions that follow this logic:

“Compared to others, our emissions are insignificant.”

“Others created the problem.”

“The others are not doing enough.”

There will always be others not doing enough. This is where we are now and it has perpetuated the politics of blame and paralysis.

A positive disruption: We Choose

The climate narrative that dominates the international debate was framed for and by high-emitting countries—mostly Europe and the U.S.  With all eyes moving toward China, the emphasis on mitigation  is expected to continue. The technical focus on mitigation, carbon and clean energy is necessary but we do not have to “cut and paste” this logic in our countries only because it dominates the U.S.-China and U.S.-Europe conversations on climate. We need our own starting point. In much of Latin America the starting point does not even have to be energy. For the most urbanized region in the world, why shouldn’t the starting point be “The City”?

As the current mitigation-centric narrative feels foreign and constraining, we will benefit from building new narratives that emphasize what we choose for ourselves. I propose:

We choose to protect people.

We choose resilience.

We choose water protection.

We choose quality of growth.

We will make our own choices because our countries deserve better.  

Latin America offers fertile ground for climate and society narratives for the 21^st century. While Europe debates austerity, many countries in our region face the opposite dilemma: how to manage growth. The wealth creation in our region is unprecedented. According to the World Bank, 50 million people joined the middle class in Latin America in the last 10 years. What kind of society does the bullish consuming class want?  How to reinvent the aspirations of a middle-income society is one of the most fascinating political tasks of our generation; and any transformative debate on climate choices must be part of a fundamental question of collective aspirations. Climate issues –we need to insist – are no longer an environmental or regulatory topic to be debated inside the walls of a technical ministry.

Our hopes and worries about the new aspirations of the Latin American middle-class triggered a fluent and vivid exchange at the workshop in Santiago. Our quest for inclusive societies is the pending task in Latin America—and, arguably, elsewhere.

Ricardo Lagos, the former President of Chile and U.N. climate envoy was the Chair of our panel. His charisma transformed the mood of the room.  What a privilege it was to discuss the power of narratives with a former Head of State. Having a statesman of his stature and credibility energized us all. I left Santiago more convinced than ever that the time is right in Latin America for mainstreaming climate as a key element of political debates this decade. This is the time to shift the conversation toward why we choose to protect people, why we choose resilience over vulnerability, and why inclusiveness is the basis of any effort to become prosperous middle-income societies.

The impacts of climate change in Latin America are increasingly alarming and greatly affect the agricultural, livestock and forestry sectors. This leads to a situation of economic, social, environmental and political vulnerability in the region; while putting at risk human and food security and the basic conditions necessary to reduce poverty.

Latin American countries should be aware and well prepared to face the challenges that climate change imposes on these important sectors of the economy, through the creation of effective and comprehensive public policies, which promote climate compatible development. This policy brief presents key guidelines that contribute to this objective.

The document emerges from a process of analysis of the status and quality of the public policies on climate change and development in ten Latin American countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, Uruguay, Colombia, El Salvador and Paraguay.

The brief suggests that the policies generated should have quality in the design, be implemented effectively, and guarantee institutional strengthening, greater awareness through social communication, and political and social support, for achieving its goals.

It observes that combing integrated climate policies to sectoral and macroeconomic policies from each country is necessary. This will help to prioritize the climate agenda and include a comprehensive global and regional approach. It also emphasizes the importance of working collaboratively between public and private institutions with a multilevel approach. These recommendations look to promote the legitimacy, sustainability and real impact of policies.

To read the policy brief click here.

During George W. Bush’s administration, the government was under pressure to act on climate change, but saw the U.N. as a dead end for negotiations.  Instead of the cumbersome talks with almost 200 countries at the table, the Bush administration favored “minilateral” or “plurilateral” solutions with small groups of countries.

Now in 2013, with a new president in the White House who was feted by the Nobel committee for renewing multilateralism, the idea of smaller plurilateral solutions seems to have kept its currency.  After two arduous decades of negotiations since the 1992 Rio de Janeiro Earth Summit when the first climate framework treaty was penned, it’s time to reconsider whether these smaller groups can break the endless stalemate.

Although the negotiations have grown tremendously complex, the core difficulty is who has to act to reduce their emissions, how much and when.  An “apple pie” phrase in the 1992 treaty is that countries should act according to their “common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities.”  It’s a pretty agreeable statement: everyone’s responsible for this global crisis, but some countries created much more of the problem so they should act, and especially those countries with the most funds. Developing countries see this as obligating the wealthy nations who have dumped the most carbon pollution into the atmosphere to act first and most aggressively to cut their emissions.  Some key wealthy countries have resisted acknowledging “historical responsibility,” since doing so might mean damage to their economic competitiveness, or maybe even imply legal liability.

But the clock has been ticking these 20 years, and time is running out.  We need a viable coalition for efficiently and adequately addressing emissions reductions, consisting of a group small enough to avoid the unworkability of full universal multilateralism and, at the same time, large enough to significantly address the issue.  This could be the week for such a step, as the Obama administration hosts representatives from a group of countries assembled precisely for breaking this impasse.

George W. Bush began a group called the “Major Economies Meeting on Energy Security and Climate Change” back in 2007, and upon arriving in the White House, President Obama renamed the group the “Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate.”  The new “MEF” was officially launched in March 2009 “to facilitate a candid dialogue among major developed and developing economies [and] help generate the political leadership necessary to achieve a successful outcome at the annual U.N. climate negotiations.”

The group has met 14 times since then, and will next meet this week from April 11-12, 2013 in Washington.  Its members include Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, the EU-27, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Russia, South Africa and the U.S.  If you add them all up, over four-fifths of all contributions to fossil fuel greenhouse gas emissions in the world are represented.  A reasonable deal within this group would be nearly five times more effective than the current commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, which only covers 15 percent of global emissions.

In a recently published Brookings’ paper, Marco Grasso of the University of Milan-Bicocca and I propose a compromise by which the MEF could break the climate negotiations impasse.  Markedly, our approach requires all key players to compromise on some demands in order for their own to be met.  The goals are fairness and feasibility.

First, we suggest the use of ‘consumption-based accounting,’ which counts emissions where products are consumed, not produced.  This would be fairer and beneficial for China, the leading current emitter and third highest emitter historically. China is the ‘workshop of the world’ and essentially the place to which other countries have outsourced their highly polluting stages of manufacturing. Because of its diverse economy, which includes significant resource extraction and primary processing of those resources, this kind of accounting also doesn’t hurt the U.S. significantly.

Second, we create a ‘carbon budget,’ based on the total amount of emissions that can still be released while keeping us below a 25 percent chance of the world warming above 2 ˚C on average.  That’s the level at which the climate change is expected to worsen to the point of unpredictable and unacceptable impacts.  Also central to the compromise, to apportion the carbon budget we propose a ‘short horizon polluter pays principle,’ which calculates responsibility for climate change from past fossil fuel emissions, but only from 1990 to 2010.  India, China and other developing nations have demanded that the wealthy countries be obligated to act based on their long histories of emitting and their capability to pay, and our short horizon polluter pays principle and use of national income as an indictor of capability address their concern.  However, limiting the responsibility for past fossil fuel emissions to a 20 year horizon is a compromise for the U.S., EU and other wealthy countries with far longer emissions histories.  While developed nations must acknowledge some responsibility, this proposed compromise only requires that they do so from the point that climate change emerged as a concern and global negotiations on the issue were underway.

This minilateral compromise within the Major Economies Forum may be the only way to avoid the disasters that lie ahead.  In this deal, all actors must bend to some demands of the other key players in order for their own to be met, as with any true compromise. The MEF can lead us down a new road by exploring this approach.

Download the full paper here.

This article was originally published on Brookings.